Laudans Theory of Scientific Aims Essay -- Laudan Science Utopia Argu

Laudans possibleness of Scientific AimsI criticize Laudans constraints on cognitive aims as presented in Science and Values. These constraints are axiological consistency and non-utopianism. I argue that (i) Laudans prescription drug for non utopian aims is too restrictive because it excludes ideals and characterizes as irrational or non-rational many human contingencies. (ii) We aim to ideals because there is no cogent way to point in advance what degree of deviation from an ideal is acceptable. Thus, one depose non pass around with ideals. (iii) Laudan does not distinguish difficult from impossible goals, making his injunction against utopianism imprecise. It is semantically utopian and, furthermore, a prescription for conservatism and mediocrity. (iv) Goals often contradict all(prenominal) other or are at least partially incompatible. Since Laudan does not say how to prioritize incompatible aims, axiological consistency is an utopian desideratum. Thus, his constraints on cog nitive aims contradict one another. Finally, (v), Laudans axiological constraints are too faltering and in order to strengthen them, he must invoke without exculpation some implicit pre-philosophical cognitive aims. This opens the logical possibility of axiological relativism, which Laudan seek from the beginning to avoid. Laudans Theory of AimsIn Science and Values, Laudan has developed the view that our scientific aims can sometimes be rationally selected by imposing two constraints (1) on them1. they should be jointly consistent,2. a pragmatic constraint of confirmable realizability, or non-utopianism. This last requisite follows from Laudans means-ends conception of rationality,To adopt a goal with the feature that we can conceive of no actions... ...victory, one obtained by just means, i.e., the means employed should not constitute a great evil than the evil the war was intended to remedy.(13) Since some axiological inconsistencies can be only pragmatic, it is not always clear whether some accruement of ideals is mutually inconsistent.(14) Cf., N. Rescher, The Strife of Systems, chapters 7 & 8.(15) When this happens, our passionate nature will find out what our intellect cannot adequately settle.(16) Laudancs meta-aim of axiological consistency is a goal fishy of being demonstrably utopian, because it is not likely that we will ever have a theory of rational value priorizations. So it is not reasonable by Laudans meta-methodology own standards. If so, Laudans theory would be suspect of being self-referentially inconsistent.(17) Cf., Laudan, 1996, Beyond logical positivism and Relativism, p. 16